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74 Abstract
During the financial and economic crisis, the public debt ratio in the European 
Union increased significantly, and public debt management had to be carried out 
in a completely new and unfavorable environment. The authors of this paper 
explore the changes in public debt management during and after the crisis. They 
describe the way in which three members of the Union – the Netherlands, Ireland 
and Hungary – dealt with the challenge of government financing during the crisis. 
These three countries were chosen because they all had a comparatively well- 
developed public debt management system before the crisis, and also due to the 
fact that during the crisis those responsible for public debt management pursued 
a policy of active accommodation to current market circumstances. Therefore, 
these case studies can illustrate the capacity of public debt management to contri-
bute to the prevention of a sovereign debt crisis. In the conclusion, the authors 
give an overview of public debt management in Croatia in the period of the crisis 
and compare it with public debt management in the three countries whose expe-
riences are presented in the paper. 
Keywords: public debt management, economic and financial crisis, European 
Union, Croatia
1 introduction 
This paper deals primarily with adjustments made to public debt management due 
to the changed circumstances that occurred during the global financial and eco-
nomic crisis of 2008 to 2009 and in the post-crisis period that ensued in most 
European countries in 2010. The object of the paper is to provide an overview of 
contemporary public debt management, to describe the challenges that have been 
faced by those working in public debt management during and immediately after 
the global crisis and to show how three countries, which can serve as examples of 
good practice, coped with these challenges. This review paper strives to present 
examples of good practice in order to provide ideas for the improvement of public 
debt management in the Republic of Croatia in general and in particular in a pe-
riod of impeded access to financing. The paper aims to demonstrate that if the 
public debt is managed in a flexible manner, public debt management can have a 
positive effect on a government’s ability to obtain sufficient and affordable fina-
ncing even during the crisis. 
The two chapters that follow the introduction describe the development of public 
debt management in general and debt management in the European Union on the 
eve of the crisis. It is pointed out that in the last decade, in most countries of the 
EU and particularly in the euro zone, public debt management has taken great 
strides in development. The basic reason for this was the stiffening of competition 
in the public debt market among the member states, which was enhanced by two 
phenomena: the disappearance of currency risk due to the introduction of the euro, 
and a reduction in the volume of instruments issued, which resulted from the de-
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75creasing level of the deficit and public debt. Consequently, the structure of debt 
has changed and so has the way in which it has been issued and traded, as well as 
the organization of public debt management and its objectives. Chapter three deals 
with the impact of the global financial and economic crisis on public debt manage-
ment. In this period in Europe, the level of debt surged, while the demand for 
public debt instruments fell rather considerably. The fourth chapter describes how 
three members of the European Union faced the challenge of financing their gov-
ernments’ requirements – the Netherlands, Ireland and Hungary. These three 
countries were chosen because before the outbreak of the crisis they were all chara-
cterized by a relatively well-developed system for public debt management; and 
yet during the crisis they have faced different intensities of fiscal imbalance. As a 
result of the developed debt management systems, the three countries managed 
during the crisis to execute flexible debt management policies, which have helped 
them (so far) to avoid a public debt crisis brought about by the financial and eco-
nomic crisis. Hence, the policies of these three countries are illustrations of the 
types of tools that public debt management can contribute to the alleviation of the 
public debt crisis. Chapter five casts a glance at public debt management in Croa-
tia during the crisis and compares it with those of the three selected countries. The 
paper finishes with conclusions and recommendations.
2 development of public debt management 
The development of public debt management is primarily affected by the environ-
ment in which the government issues or manages the public debt as well as by the 
level of competence of the institution that is given the responsibility of public debt 
management. In most countries, the management of the public debt goes through 
several typical developmental phases: non-market government borrowing, transi-
tion towards a market-oriented system, asset-liability management and finally the 
provision of treasury services in combination with asset-liability management 
(Storkey, 2006).
In the first phase, governments rely on non-market instruments in order to finance 
debt that is due and to finance considerable amounts of fiscal deficits. An underde-
veloped domestic debt market essentially restricts the choice of debt instruments, 
and the government on the whole takes on debt using banking loans or loans from 
international financial institutions, or preferential loans (Storkey, 2006). In this 
phase, even direct financing from a central bank can be one of the sources of gove-
rnment financing. Debt monetization as a way of deficit financing has pronoun-
cedly negative implications for the economy, such as inflation caused by an in-
crease in base money. When governments cease to finance through printing mon-
ey, emphasis is put on public debt management and on the development of a mar-
ket-oriented way of deficit financing. 
In the non-market borrowing phase, the functions of debt management are limited 
and are comprised of keeping books and records on borrowing transactions and 
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76 the repayment of debt. Separate bodies which should be given the responsibility 
of managing the public debt have not yet been founded, and debt management 
does not exist as a distinct policy but is carried out within the framework of mon-
etary or fiscal policy (Storkey, 2006).
The second phase of public debt management is the transition towards a market-
oriented system of government borrowing. The main characteristic of this phase is 
reliance on debt management with an emphasis on risk management and the inte-
gration of debt management with the management of all government cash flows. 
In this phase, the primary financing mechanism is the financial market through 
which the funding for government needs is acquired by the issuance of bonds. The 
development of a domestic securities market enables a transition from a bank-ori-
ented to a market-oriented borrowing system. Market orientation causes greater 
exposure to financial risks and, therefore, risk management becomes the crucial 
element of modern public debt management. Governments start to found separate 
organizational units or offices, called debt management offices or DMOs, which 
constitute an institutional solution for the operational aspects of public debt mana-
gement. The establishment of independent organizational units implies the separa-
tion of debt management from fiscal policy, which leads to important changes in 
the way debt is managed. At the same time, management of public debt is split off 
from monetary policy, which enables the integration of debt and cash manage-
ment and, thus, the reduction of expensive cash surpluses to minimal states and 
better planning of government bond issues.
The third phase of public debt management sees the government applying the ap-
proach of managing total assets and liabilities – in other words, asset-liability 
management (ALM) – so as to coordinate the financial characteristics of assets 
and liabilities and, thus, manage the risks to the government’s balance sheet. Pub-
lic debt management in this phase starts to include not only explicit debt but also 
contingent liabilities, which are an important source of fiscal risks. In this way, a 
realistic picture of the fiscal position of the state is obtained. Future budgetary 
revenues represent the main element of a government’s assets, and they are most 
often denominated in the domestic currency and insensitive to movements in 
short-term interest rates and inflation. If debt and contingent liabilities are issued 
in the domestic currency and if the liabilities have short maturity and are not infla-
tion-indexed, the government’s exposure to exchange rate, interest and inflation 
rate risks can be considerably reduced (Wheeler, 2004).
The last phase in the development of public debt management is the provision of 
treasury services to other government agencies and local government units cou-
pled with asset and liability management (Storkey, 2006). The scope of the func-
tions of the DMO is widened to include the evaluation of government loans, ad-
vising government bodies about cash and risk management, advice or control re-
lated to public-private partnerships, services of taking deposits or extending loans 
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77to local government units or other public bodies. DMOs, through the services of 
receiving deposits and giving loans, provide an alternative to the use of bankers’ 
services and, thus, enable government savings (NTMA, 2010b). The administra-
tion of government assets and liabilities includes active government asset man-
agement and specific government sector funds management (Williams, 2006).
3  management of public debt in the european union just 
before the crisis
Earlier on in the academic literature, it was taken for granted that public debt is 
managed only to achieve macroeconomic objectives such as smoothing the tax 
burden over a period of time or establishing macroeconomic stability. But practice 
has redefined the aims of public debt management. The primary or direct objective 
of a DMO in most countries, including in member states of the European Union, 
became the financing of government borrowing requirements at the lowest possi-
ble costs and achieving an acceptable level of risk. The development of the gov-
ernment bond market is secondary or an indirect objective of debt management, 
since a developed capital market can contribute to minimizing the costs of govern-
ment borrowing. The separation of fiscal policy that determines the debt level 
from the policy of public debt management aimed at creating an optimum debt 
structure was the precondition for concentrating on the primary objective of debt 
management. Although separated, public debt management policy supports fiscal 
policy by reducing the interest expenditures and by avoiding the risks of excessive 
fluctuations in debt servicing.
DMOs in some countries are set up as separate agencies independent of finance 
ministries and central banks, since the greater complexity of products and compe-
tition among public debt managers requires greater operational independence and 
professionalism, which are easier to achieve in a non-governmental institution 
(Wolswijk and de Haan, 2005). Regardless of the institutional position of the pub-
lic debt management office, a greater degree of operational autonomy will enable 
debt managers to do their job in accordance with market principles. 
As public debt management policy has developed, and with the involvement of an 
increasing number of foreign investors, the degree of integration in European 
bond markets has increased, tending to produce convergence in the structure of 
the public debt of the European Union members. The creation of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union additionally speeded up the convergence process, 
and the main determinants of differences in the government bonds yields are the 
liquidity and default risks, not the currency risk, since bonds are denominated in 
the same currency (Favero, Missale and Piga, 2000). The disappearance of cur-
rency risk, the reduction of credit risk which was enabled by the fiscal discipline 
stipulated by Maastricht and the reduction on liquidity premiums were key influ-
ences in the reduction of sovereign borrowing costs for the countries that had 
joined the EMU. 
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78 Fostering the development of a liquid secondary market for government bonds led 
to an increase in the issuance of marketable debt instruments and the standardiza-
tion of government bonds and market conventions. Standard long-term debt in-
struments now tend to be government bonds with fixed coupon interest without 
any incorporated options and common maturities of 2, 3, 5, 10 and 30 years. In 
addition to the standard bonds, increased importance is being assumed by infla-
tion-linked bonds that preserve the value of investors’ investments. The percent-
age of non-marketable debt has been much reduced, and the share of loans in total 
debt now comes to less than 10%. Instruments meant for households, savings 
bonds and savings banks in post offices have retained or increased their share 
(Favero, Missale and Piga, 2000). The development of interest swaps has enabled 
the issuance of long-term bonds on the liquid segment of the capital market and 
the achievement of reduced costs because of the low short-term interest rates 
(Wolswijk and de Haan, 2005). 
The introduction of the single currency reduced the amount of foreign currency-
denominated debt, and access to a broad investor base diminished the necessity to 
borrow outside the euro zone and at the same time brought about changes in debt 
ownership structure (figure 1).
figure 1
Share of non-residents in ownership of general government debt in selected euro 
zone countries in 2004 and 2009 (in %)
Source: Eurostat.
In most states of the euro zone, over half of general government debt at the end of 
2009 was in the hands of non-residents, but the share of foreign currency- 
denominated debt was small, i.e. less than 10 percent. Those states that borrow in 
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79a foreign currency use currency swaps to reduce the exchange rate exposure of the 
debt. The establishment of the euro zone reduced long-term interest rates and in-
creased the share of long-term debt in total debt. There has also been strong con-
vergence in the average maturity of the debt, which in most euro zone states comes 
to about 6 years.
4  impact of the financial and economic crisis on public debt 
management in the european union
One of the key conditions for countries to enter the euro zone, the public finance 
sustainability criteria, was achieved by fiscal consolidation i.e. the reduction of 
the share of deficit and public debt in GDP. Reduced need for government borrow-
ing resulted in a smaller supply of government debt instruments and consequently 
with an endeavour to preserve liquidity on the government securities market. The 
financial and economic crisis has completely changed the situation. Government 
borrowing requirements have largely exceeded the previously planned amounts 
and financing these requirements has become uncertain. 
figure 2
Government debt in the EU and the euro area (in % of GDP)
Source: Eurostat.
A significant rise in the general government debt ratio after 2007 can be seen in 
both the euro zone and the EU as a whole (figure 2). The rise in government bor-
rowing needs was prompted not only by cyclical factors, but also by the additional 
capitalization and (re)nationalization of parts of the financial sector.1 The yield on 
the EU country government bonds at the end of 2010 was on average lower than 
at the end of 2007, i.e. 4.7% as opposed to 5.4% (www.oenb.at). However, the rise 
1 In the EMU, operations in the form of recapitalization or purchase of parts of the financial system, that were 
undertaken up to the end of 2009 with an aim of stabilizing the financial sector, increased the share of public 
debt in GDP in these countries by 2.5% of GDP, while their contingent liabilities rose by a minimum 20% of 
GDP (Attinasi, 2010).
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80 in the general government debt ratio and the reduced demand of investors in most 
countries, particularly in the new members of the EU, resulted in a considerable 
rise in sovereign yield spreads (figure 3).
figure 3 
Spreads of ten-year government bonds over German Federal bonds (in %)
Source: ECB, Thomson Reuters.
Quite often auctions of government bonds were postponed, cancelled or were un-
successful due to sharper competition on the European capital market and due to 
weakened demand (Blommestein, 2009). In order to adjust to the new market 
conditions and to make sure the financial needs of the state were met, the mana-
gers of public debt brought in a number of innovations, with respect to the debt 
instruments and the way in which they were issued, as well as with respect to in-
vestor communications and orientation to new groups of investors (table 1). 
In the period of crisis, syndicated bond issues became increasingly popular for the 
sake of ensuring sales and achieving a greater volume of issues on the market. 
Nevertheless, auctions are the preferred issue technique for the issuance of short-
term and long-term debt. Some countries introduced auction fees, but there were 
also different changes in the actual technique of issuing, such as more the frequent 
organization of auctions and the post-auction facility.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
A
us
tri
a
B
el
gi
um
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
G
re
ec
e
Ir
el
an
d
Ita
ly
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Th
e 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Po
rtu
ga
l
Sp
ai
n
Sw
ed
en U
K
B
ul
ga
ria
C
yp
ru
s
C
ze
ch
 R
.
H
un
ga
ry
La
tv
ia
Li
th
ua
ni
a
M
al
ta
Po
la
nd
R
om
an
ia
Sl
ov
ak
 R
.
Sl
ov
en
ia
2007 2010
a
n
a a
n
d
a
b
a
k
a b
a
d
u
r
in
a, sa
n
d
r
a šva
ljek: 
pu
b
lic d
eb
t m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t b
efo
r
e, d
u
r
in
g a
n
d a
fter 
th
e c
r
isis
fin
a
n
c
ia
l  th
eo
ry a
n
d 
pr
a
c
tic
e
36 (1) 73-100 (2012)
81
Aggravated conditions for the long-term debt issues and increased market volati-
lity have been reflected in the maturity structure of debt. In the period from 2007 
to 2009, there was a considerable rise in short-term debt, which mirrors the inve-
table 1
Changes in public debt management as a result of the global crisis in selected EU 
members
State Changes brought about by the global crisis
Austria Greater emphasis on the improvement of investor relations.
Belgium Successive long-term debt issues. Increased use of EMTN (Euro Medium 
Term Notes).
Denmark Private placements on foreign markets in 2008. More frequent auctions 
instead of successive bond issues.
Finland Diversification of sources of financing, improving investor relations and 
better coordination with primary dealers.
France Increased flexibility in line with investor needs. There were several off-
the-run bond auctions from mid-2007 on.
Greece From 2009, auctions of T-bills became single-price auctions. For all kinds 
of bonds and for off-the-run bonds syndicated issues were used.
Ireland Introduction of syndicated bond issues and use of auctions even for short-
term bonds. The introduction of T-bills and USCP (US Commercial Pro-
gram) for short-term borrowing in the US. In 2010 a national solidarity 
bond was introduced, aimed at encouraging long-term household savings, 
with maturity dates of up to 10 years.
Italy More flexible issuance procedures. Increased amounts of new issues and 
the possibility for offering additional amounts of off-the-run bonds in 
volatile market conditions. Adjustment of the price-setting mechanism at 
auctions (the issuer has the discretionary right to determine the amount for 
allocation within the previously published range). At T-bill auctions inves-
tors made bids expressed in yields. Range of maturities for sale to primary 
dealers according to non-competitive bids is increased. Introduction of 
regular meetings with investors.
Hungary More flexible calendar of auctions and amount of issues. Introduction of 
auction fees and non-competitive bids at auctions. More frequent issu-
ances of off-the-run bonds and conducting of buy-back auctions. Planned 
introduction of exchange auctions. Introduction of regular meetings with 
institutional investors.
The  
Netherlands
Increased frequency of off-the-run bond auctions. More frequent issuance 
of commercial bills, T-bills and intensification of repo operations with 
government bonds.
Germany Successive sale for long-term debt and more frequent auctions.
UK Introduction of mini-tenders (2008) and syndicated issues (2009 and 2010) 
as more flexible distribution channels along with the usual auctions. Intro-
duction of the possibility of subscribing to additional amounts of govern-
ment bonds for investors whose tenders were accepted at the auction, the 
post-auction facility.
Source: Blommenstein, Vayvada and Ibarlucea (2010a) and the authors.
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82 stor orientation towards short-term sovereign debt instruments, but leads to an 
increased roll-over risk. Among the changes in debt instruments, the most pro-
nounced were the introduction of new short-term and medium-term instruments 
and the increased issuance of short-term bonds in accordance with investor prefe-
rences (figure 4). 
figure 4 
Short-term debt as a proportion of total general government debt in selected EU 
countries from 2007 to 2009 (in %)
Source: Eurostat.
The crisis has also affected the primary dealers’ efficiency in carrying out their 
tasks in the primary and secondary markets. Accordingly, governments decided to 
review the existing arrangements with respect to requirements for obtaining the 
primary dealer status as well as with respect to the obligations of the primary dea-
lers. Some governments attempted to achieve better coordination with primary 
dealers, while others increased the scope of their obligations in order to enhance 
liquidity in the government bonds market.
In the much more difficult market circumstances in which member states compe-
ted with each other to attract investors, the DMOs were faced with demanding 
tasks. Flexibility in procedures for issuing government debt enabled debt mana-
gers more easily to adjust to the new borrowing conditions and make use of market 
opportunities once they occurred. Reduced predictability of government bor-
rowing needs laid stress on the importance of developing collaboration not only 
with the market, i.e. domestic and foreign investors, but also with the central bank 
and other DMOs, so as to build up a transparent framework for public debt mana-
gement by high quality communication (Blommestein et al., 2010b).
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83Temporary impossibilities for bond placements, the shortfall in investor demand 
that led to the cancellation of auctions and competition in the government bond 
market particularly in the euro zone, led to the idea to create a common debt in-
strument to be issued by euro zone countries. Bonds of the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) bonds that were issued in order to gather financial re-
sources to help Ireland can be seen as this kind of instrument. The idea to create a 
supranational financial instrument to be issued at the EMU level that would, thus, 
reduce speculation concerning an individual member state and make use of the 
liquidity of the single market represented an interesting consequence of the crisis, 
even if a dubious one in conditions of the relatively low fiscal capacity of the su-
pranational EU level.
5 public debt management practice during the crisis
This chapter will give a description of the way in which public debt was managed 
during or just after the crisis in three countries – the Netherlands, Hungary and 
Ireland. These three countries were selected because it can be considered that the 
debt management in these countries is fairly well developed and that it is con-
ducted in line with good practice and the recommendations of the WB and IMF 
(World Bank, International Monetary Fund, 2001). In terms of the degrees of de-
velopment outlined in chapter one above, management of public debt in Ireland is 
in the highest or fourth stage. In the Netherlands and Hungary, according to many 
of its features, debt management belongs to the highest stage too, but management 
of the totality of the government assets and liabilities is not employed. All three 
countries are members of the EU, with Ireland and the Netherlands also being 
euro area member states; while Hungary, a new member state, is still outside of 
the euro zone. The global economic crisis had different effects on the fiscal deficit 
and public debt development in these countries, as it did on the intensity of the 
challenges that public debt management institutions had to meet during the crisis 
(table 2).
All three countries faced a considerable rise in sovereign yield spreads very soon 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, i.e. in the early fall of 2008. Due to the 
important deceleration of international capital flows in early spring 2009, they 
saw another jump in their bond spreads. Thenceforward, spreads on Hungarian 
and Dutch bonds began to fall, while the spread on the Irish bonds, impacted by 
an exceptionally severe fiscal crisis, continued to grow. No recovery of the Irish 
government bond was anywhere in sight even at the end of the period under ob-
servation (figure 5). In addition, because of the deep fiscal crisis which was caused, 
among other things, by the state recapitalization of the financial system, in 2010 
Ireland saw a negative rate of economic growth (Attinasi, 2010).
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84 table 2
Fiscal indicators and government bond yields, 2008-2010
The Netherlands Ireland Hungary
Fiscal indicators, in % of GDP,  
period average
General government debt
Net general government borrowing
 61.1
 -3.5
 68.0
-17.9
 77.0
  -4.1
Average yields on 10-year bond, %
Minimum
Maximum
Average
Standard deviation
   2.5 (IX/10)
   4.7 (VII-VII/08)
   3.6
   0.6
   4.1 (III/08)
   8.3 (XII/10)
   5.1
   0.9
   6.6 (III/10)
 11.4 (III/09)
   8.2
   1.2
Spread on 10-year bond over  
German Federal bonds, %
Minimum
Maximum
Average
Standard deviation
   1.1 (I-II, 0.8)
   0.7 (I-II/09)
   0.3
   0.2
   0.2 (I/08)
   5.5 (XII/10)
   1.7
   1.4
   3.1 (I/08)
   8.6 (III/09)
   4.9
   1.2
Source: Eurostat, ECB, Thomson Reuters, Dutch State Treasury Agency, Hungarian Statistics 
Office, authors’ calculation.
figure 5
Spreads of ten-year government bonds over German Federal bonds (in basis 
points)
Source: Eurostat, Bloomberg.
5.1  public debt management during the crisis:  
the case of ireland
The National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) was founded in 1990 when 
the government decided to change the organization of debt management. The ris-
ing amount and increasing complexity of public debt in the decade preceding its 
The Netherlands
1/
08
4/
08
7/
08
10
/0
8
1/
09
4/
09
7/
09
10
/0
9
1/
10
4/
10
7/
10
10
/1
0
1/
11
4/
11
Hungary Ireland
1,000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
a
n
a a
n
d
a
b
a
k
a b
a
d
u
r
in
a, sa
n
d
r
a šva
ljek: 
pu
b
lic d
eb
t m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t b
efo
r
e, d
u
r
in
g a
n
d a
fter 
th
e c
r
isis
fin
a
n
c
ia
l  th
eo
ry a
n
d 
pr
a
c
tic
e
36 (1) 73-100 (2012)
85foundation showed that within the framework of the Ministry of Finance it was 
impossible to employ and retain expert professional staff. Once the various orga-
nizational solutions for public debt management had been considered, it was fi-
nally decided to found a separate agency for debt management outside the public 
sector but still directly controlled by the Ministry. In addition to debt manage-
ment, it expanded its functions to manage the whole of government finances and 
the associated risks (see: www.ntma.ie). Today the NTMA manages the National 
Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF), the National Asset Management Agency 
(NTMA), the National Development Finance Agency (NDFA), and the State 
Claims Agency. In addition, some of the functions of the banking system once in 
the purview of the Ministry of Finance have been transferred to the Agency. The 
main goal of this Agency is to collect funding for the government at minimum 
costs and an acceptable exposure to risk, while attempting to outperform the 
benchmark portfolio and to meet a debt servicing cost forecasted in the budget.
Every year the NTMA issues its Annual Report and its Accounts, in which it pres-
ents a review of its activities in the preceding year. In these reports it describes 
sources of funding, debt management activity and the profile of the debt produced. 
The review of activities and debt instruments, the amount of the debt at the end of 
the year, data about primary dealers, a description of government finances and 
statistical data about economic trends in the previous year are available in the 
Ireland Information Memorandum which the Agency issues on a yearly basis. 
Along with these documents and an overview and the results of its operation in the 
past year, on its Internet site the NTMA provides regular information about ac-
tivities related to public debt management and provides a great deal of informa-
tion about debt instruments, announces the timetable of auctions to be held and 
publishes calendars for the issuance of T-bills and other relevant information.
The real challenge for NTMA started in 2009, with the outburst of a severe eco-
nomic crisis in Ireland. The country was faced with a rising and entirely unpre-
dictable budgetary deficit that rose from 7.3% in 2008 to 14.4% of GDP in 2009, 
and then in 2010 to as much as 31.9%. The growth of the deficit had a substantial 
impact on the development of market yield on government bonds. The spreads on 
Irish 10-year government bonds over German government bonds expanded be-
cause of the banking crisis, the rise in the debt of general government, and the 
marked volatility on the capital market (figure 6).
The NTMA had to find a way of responding with sufficient flexibility to the in-
creased government need for financing. It enlarged its manoeuvring space by ad-
justing the timing of the bond issue with the interests of investors. During 2009 
the NTMA built up the strong cash position of the Ministry of Finance by an in-
creased orientation to short-term borrowing. Diversification of short-term sources 
of financing was achieved by the issuance of standard T-bills and specific com-
mercial bills, US Commercial Papers, meant for the collection of short-term li-
quidity surpluses on the American market in American dollars. The total unre-
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86 deemed debt produced by the issuance of these short-term instruments came to 
12.4 billion euro or 76.6% of the total unredeemed debt created by the issuance of 
short-term securities. 
figure 6 
Ireland-Germany 10 year bond yield spread and the general government debt 
ratio 
Source: Bloomberg, Eurostat.
By investing in various savings instruments during 2009, the household sector 
provided the state with a net inflow of 1.76 billion euro, which was the greatest 
amount raised since the foundation of the NTMA (NTMA, 2010b). In 2009 the 
government offered six savings instruments with maturities up to 5.5 years, and 
the unredeemed debt to households came to 9.3 billion euro at the end of the year. 
In 2010 NTMA introduced the National Solidarity Bond with redemption dates of 
up to 10 years in order to encourage individuals and families to save long term. Up 
to mid-2010, the private sector put 74 million euro into the NSB, thus, contribut-
ing to the financial bailout of the state; while the government, in return, offered the 
option of redemption on demand.
Four new benchmark series of government bonds were issued in syndicated is-
sues, accounting for 68% of the total value of issued bonds in 2009. In 2010 Ire-
land had just one syndicated issuance of a new series of bonds amounting to 5 
billion euro, which constituted only one quarter of the total value of bonds issued 
in that year. New series of bonds were issued with the objective of building up the 
government yield curve. In the middle of 2010, Ireland thus had 11 benchmark 
issues of bonds with maturities stretching to 2025 (NTMA, 2010a). From March 
to December 2009, NTMA once again held monthly auctions at which investors 
had the chance to choose between two issues of existing bonds, and it continued 
this practice up to September 2010. After the close of competitive auctions, non-
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87competitive auctions were held at which primary dealers could subscribe to post-
auction facilities. Primary dealers had the option of subscribing to up to 15% of 
the value of the bonds issued at a competitive auction, in proportion to their shares 
in the subscribed bonds. An additional 15% was available for the three primary 
dealers who, according to the NTMA’s assessment, were the most successful in 
maintaining the liquidity of the on-the-run government bonds (NTMA, 2010b).
Ireland presents a good example of a country that during the crisis managed to 
finance the government debt although it had exploded to unprecedented propor-
tions. From this, it is clear that this success resulted from an innovative and flex-
ible debt management, from the point of view of adjusting to market circum-
stances with respect to the category and residence of investors, as well as the type 
of securities, maturity dates, currencies, and manner of issuance. 
5.2  management of public debt during the crisis:  
the case of the netherlands
The Dutch State Treasury Agency (DSTA) has an exceptionally long tradition. It 
was founded in 1841 in order to assist the finance minister in running the govern-
ment finances and servicing debts incurred during the time of Napoleon. It is an 
integral part of the government treasury and, hence, positioned institutionally 
within the Finance Ministry. Not only does it manage the debt, but it also has the 
responsibility of managing contingent liabilities; at the beginning of 2009 it was 
merged with the cash management department and took on the obligation to ma-
nage cash which includes the internal cash management of government and of a 
larger number of public and semi-public organizations and the strategic organiza-
tion of the infrastructure of government payments and assessment of the budge-
tary cash position (see: www.dsta.nl). 
At the end of each year, the DSTA publishes for the following year an extensive 
publication in which in addition to projections of macroeconomic and fiscal deve-
lopments and developments on the financial market there is an assessment of the 
government borrowing requirements, the objectives and plan of government bonds 
issuance according to the types of bonds, a list of primary dealers and their 
obligations and an abundance of statistical information (Dutch State Treasury 
Agency, 2010). It also publishes quarterly publications and occasional papers, 
most often in connection with new issues of government bonds. 
Of the three countries presented in this paper, the Netherlands got over the crisis 
and its effect on the possibility of borrowing and of managing debt with the fewest 
difficulties, although fiscal balance had been sensibly disturbed. The level of pu-
blic debt rose from 45.3% of GDP at the end of 2007 to 64.4% at the end of 2010. 
The Netherlands applies an expenditure fiscal rule and, in spite of the crisis, ma-
naged to prevent excessive debt growth. Due to strict control over public finances, 
the amount of the debt at the end of 2009 and in 2010 was from two to three per-
centage points lower than had been planned earlier. 
a
n
a a
n
d
a
b
a
k
a b
a
d
u
r
in
a, sa
n
d
r
a šva
ljek: 
pu
b
lic d
eb
t m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t b
efo
r
e, d
u
r
in
g a
n
d a
fter 
th
e c
r
isis
fin
a
n
c
ia
l  th
eo
ry a
n
d 
pr
a
c
tic
e
36 (1) 73-100 (2012)
88 The price of Dutch government borrowing during the whole of the crisis did not 
rise significantly. It reached the maximum average coupon rate on a ten-year bond 
in mid-2008, when it came to 4.7%, and the spread, compared to the average cou-
pon rate of the German ten-year bond, came to 0.7%. At the end of the 2010 the 
fiscal situation had completely stabilized, so the spread had fallen to below 0.2% 
over the ten-year German government bonds (table 2, figure 7). 
During 2008 the Netherlands faced the highest rise in the government borrowing 
requirement in relation to the originally planned levels. Although in that year, ac-
cording to ESA 95, the general government made a surplus of 0.6%, the cash de-
ficit, which actually creates the need to borrow, came to as much as 14% of GDP.2 
Over 40% of the increase in the borrowing requirement resulted from the loan to 
the Fortis Bank Netherlands, and the rest was also in large part connected with the 
recapitalization and nationalization of this bank as well as the nationalization of 
ABN AMRO. The credit line was financed short term on the money market 
(DSTA, 2009). DSTA increased the frequency of auctions of T-bills from two to 
four times a month, and this frequency of auctions lasted from October 2008 to 
February 2009.
During 2009, although the borrowing requirement was again greater than planned, 
the DSTA attempted as much as possible not to use short-term but rather long-
term capital market instruments. Due to the modest interest in subscribing to any 
bonds but the standard bonds, one more monthly auction was introduced; while in 
order to increase liquidity, the DSTA resorted to an additional issuance of larger 
amounts of three kinds of off-the-run bonds. Even during the period of the deepest 
crisis, the DSTA did not deviate from its principles of transparency, flexibility and 
continuity, which is reflected in the standard and long-term issues.
In 2010 there were no new surprises in the sense of increased need for financing 
as compared with the earlier plans. DSTA continued to accommodate the supply 
of government bonds to the market needs. In order to expand its investor base, 
DSTA added to its usual 3, 5 and 10-year bonds a bond with 30-year maturity. In 
2011 plans to issue a bond denominated in the US dollars (DSTA, 2010).
During the crisis, fiscal imbalance in the Netherlands was milder than in Ireland, 
but in 2008 and early 2009 the need for financing was also very high. In the 
Netherlands too, public debt management coped very well. On the one hand, at-
tention was paid so that the determined debt management principles were not 
abandoned; while at the same time, market circumstances were taken into consi-
deration and the types of issues were adjusted to them, as were the frequency and 
2 The difference between cash deficit and deficit according to ESA 95 is caused by financial transactions 
(mostly revenue from privatization and expenditures for extended student loans) and cash flows that occur 
in a year that do not coincide with the year of the transaction (DSTA, 2009). Cash expenditures related to the 
nationalization of banks occurred at the end of 2008 and were included in the measure of the deficit according 
to ESA 95 in 2009.
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89manner of issuing bonds. Here, public debt management helped in softening the 
impact of the crisis on the stability of public finances.
figure 7
The Netherlands-Germany 10 year bond yield spread and the general govern-
ment debt ratio 
Source: Bloomberg, Eurostat.
5.3  public debt management during the crisis:   
the case of hungary
The Hungarian public debt management agency, called ÁKK, was founded in 
1995 as an organizational unit of the Ministry of Finance. In the years to come it 
was to acquire increasing independence. It became an independent company in 
the portfolio of the Minister of Finance in 2001, and in 2010 in the portfolio of the 
Minister of the National Economy. The board of ÁKK is responsible for making 
decisions about public debt management, and in some cases the Minister of Finan-
ce as well. The functions of ÁKK include debt management and liquidity mana-
gement of the single treasury account and keeping records about the public debt.
 
The basic objective of ÁKK is to provide the central government with financing 
at the lowest possible costs over the long run, taking into account risks. It is parti-
cularly devoted to its assignment of providing prompt and easily accessible infor-
mation about government borrowing and the public debt market. It publishes a 
number of publications such as annual, quarterly and monthly reports about the 
management of the public debt, annual plans and a calendar of bond issues. Stati-
stical data about the amount of the public debt, auction results, types of issues and 
developments on the secondary market are regularly updated and published on its 
Internet site (www.ákk.hu).
Hungary went through a fiscal crisis before the beginning of the global economic 
crisis. In the period from 2002 to 2007, its fiscal deficits came on average to 7.5% 
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90 and the level of the debt rose in the same period by 11 percentage points in terms 
of GDP. When the economic crisis broke out, Hungary experienced a severe capi-
tal flight, domestic bonds were sold by foreign investors, and the activity on the 
domestic debt market almost disappeared. In this period only the T-bills market 
remained active and households played a crucial role in the government bonds 
market (Government Debt Management Agency, 2010a).
For this reason in November 2008, Hungary signed a 17-month stand-by arrange-
ment with the IMF, later extended to October 2010. While the arrangement was 
on-going, and in spite of the financial crisis, fiscal consolidation was carried out 
and the fiscal deficit was reduced to 4.1% of GDP on average from 2008 to 2010. 
Due to the rapid decline in business activity, the public debt ratio kept growing 
and at the end of 2010 exceeded 80% of GDP. In 2010 the rate of growth in the 
debt/GDP ratio slowed from the previous year due to a mild recovery in economic 
activity.
In mid-2009 the government bonds market revived again and Hungary, in contrast 
to its original plans, managed to issue on the market a 10-year bond of 1 billion 
euro with a yield of 6.77%. At the same time it increased its financing based on 
short-term instruments (T-bills and T-bonds). In order to meet the needs of inve-
stors on the domestic market, ÁKK ceased to determine the types of bonds that 
were to be the object of regular announced auctions in advance. Instead, they 
agreed on the type of bonds with the primary dealers and advertised the agreement 
a week before the auctions. Successful bidders were able to engage in non-com-
petitive purchasing after the auctions had been conducted. In order to encourage 
investment in government bonds on the retail market, citizens were offered infla-
tion-linked bonds.
In its management of the public debt, ÁKK is guided by benchmark values for the 
currency structure of the debt, the proportion of the debt in foreign currency, the 
ratio of domestic and foreign debt, the fixed/flexible interest rate ratio, and the 
maturity and the amount of funds in the single treasury account. Most of the pu-
blic debt is in marketable securities, which at the end of 2009 consisted of 30 bond 
issues denominated in Hungarian forints, 22 issues denominated in foreign cur-
rency (over 99% in euro) and 18 issues of T-bills denominated in forints (Govern-
ment Debt Management Agency, 2010a).
Management of the public debt in Hungary adheres to the principles of simplicity, 
transparency and liquidity. Simplicity and transparency are achieved with a re-
stricted number of simple (plain vanilla) issues and the issuance of bonds in line 
with an issue calendar defined in advance. In order to boost the secondary market 
liquidity, in 2008 ÁKK carried out buy-back auctions in the amount of approxima-
tely 2 billion euro, and in 2009 stepped up the issuance of additional off-the-run 
bonds. 
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91After the 2009 issue, Hungary issued three more bond series on the international 
market, one in 2010 and two in 2011. Apart from the most frequent 10-year bonds, 
it issued one series of bonds with a maturity of 30 years denominated in American 
dollars. This series bears a coupon interest rate of 7.625%. The 2011 plan does not 
include the specificities of the bond issues on the international market; rather, their 
characteristics and the timing of issuance is defined on the basis of the market 
circumstances (Government Debt Management Agency, 2010b). 
The example of Hungary shows that not even a sound management of public debt 
can ensure financing when investors perceive fiscal policy to be unsustainable. In 
the situation of the fiscal crisis, Hungary had to rely on the assistance of interna-
tional financial institutions. Still, due to flexible debt management, Hungary was 
able to restore investors’ confidence soon after the crisis and ensured the neces-
sary level of financing on the government debt market, although at high price. 
figure 8
Hungary-Germany 10 year bond yield spread and the general government debt 
ratio
Sources: Bloomberg, Eurostat.
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6  management of the public debt in croatia before 
and during the crisis
The objectives of public debt management in Croatia are defined in the Budget 
Law (OG 87/2008) and by the guidelines of economic and fiscal policy that are 
drawn up every year for the year to come. In accordance with international good 
practice, these documents state that public debt has to be managed in such a way 
as to ensure that the government’s financing needs are met at the lowest medium- 
and long-term costs while assuming a prudent degree of risk. Apart from this ge-
neral objective of debt management, in these documents not many more details 
about debt management plans for the period to come are revealed. Up to the mo-
ment of the onset of the economic crisis, only once was a document published in 
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92 which a strategy for managing the public debt was determined (Annual Report 
and Public Debt Management Guidelines, Ministry of Finance, 2007); and a new 
document of this kind was published only at the beginning of 2011, describing 
public debt management plans in the period from 2011 to 2013 (Ministry of Fi-
nance, 2011). 
The institutional framework for public debt management has not changed much 
since its establishment, and debt management is still left in the hands of the Public 
Debt Management Directorate of the Government Treasury which, accordingly, is 
not independent of the Ministry of Finance. This institutional framework is re-
flected in the way in which information about details of public debt management 
is released. Scant information about the structure and amount of the debt is pu-
blished in the monthly and annual publications of the Ministry of Finance (Mon-
thly Statistical Reviews, Annual Reviews of the Ministry). Detailed information 
about the structure of the debt, past activities of debt management, plans or calen-
dars of auctions are not available, which essentially diminishes the transparency 
and predictability of debt management. Far less can be found about public debt 
management in Croatia from publicly available sources than in many countries of 
the EU. According to the scope and characteristics of public debt management, it 
can be deemed that Croatia is in transition from the first to the second phase, with 
respect to development.
During the economic crisis, government financing became much more difficult 
and risk aversion of potential investors led to a strong rise in the price of bor-
rowing. Hence, in Croatia too, as in many other countries, the financial needs of 
government had to be met in line with what was objectively possible, and not ac-
cording to the objectives and plan set in advance.
The period of the economic crisis for Croatia was also a period of excessive need 
for government financing, not only because of the disturbed fiscal balance and the 
rise in net government borrowing. The additional causes of increased need for fi-
nancing were that a large part of the existing debt was due for repayment, and there 
was a need to finance the payment of the so-called pensioners’ debt which caused 
the debt increment to exceed the amounts of the annual deficit. The general gover-
nment borrowing requirement was, for these reasons, very high in 2009 and 2010 
when it rose to 8.4 and 11% of GDP respectively (see table 3). In the period from 
2007 to 2010, which will be considered here in order to gain a good understanding 
of public debt management during the economic crisis, one can observe not only a 
constant rise in the public debt level, but also considerable change in its structure.
Unlike the period before and at the beginning of the crisis, when the explicit 
objective of public debt management was oriented towards borrowing on the do-
mestic market, during the crisis this objective was abandoned and after November 
2009 the government again started borrowing more vigorously on the foreign 
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93markets. Hence, the share of central government foreign debt fell from 34% at the 
beginning of 2008 to 27% in October 2009 and then rose, and at the end of 2010 
came to 32%. Although potential liabilities are not an object of particular conside-
ration in this paper, it should be mentioned that from the beginning of 2008 to the 
end of 2010 the total consolidated government guarantees issued rose by 20 bil-
lion kuna, that is, almost 50% (figure 9).
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Consolidated central government debt (billion kuna)
Source: Croatian National Bank.
table 3
Deficit, debt and borrowing requirements of consolidated general government  
(billion kuna)
2007 2008 2009 2010
Net borrowing of consolidated general government 4.4 3.0 10.4 14.3
Net interest costs of general government 5.6 5.0 5.6 6.3
General government borrowing requirement 11.6 13.4 28.1 36.9
Change in the debt from previous year 2.0 -4.4 17.7 21.3
Total general government debt 104.5 100.1 117.8 139.2
In % of GDP
Net borrowing of general government 1.4 0.9 3.1 4.3
Net interest costs of general government 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.9
General government borrowing requirement 3.7 3.9 8.4 11.0
Change in the debt from previous year 0.6 -1.3 5.3 6.4
Total general government debt 33.2 29.3 35.4 41.6
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia, CBS.
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94 During the crisis, tax revenues increasingly diverged from the usual and planned 
amount, and the need for financial resources rose in a way that could not have 
been predicted when the budget was prepared and the way of deficit financing was 
determined. Because of the unexpectedly poor collection of tax revenues, and 
because of the impossibility of, or high costs involved in, long-term financing, 
from the end of 2008 the need for financing was increasingly met by short-term 
borrowing. At the beginning of 2008, the proportion of short-term debt in total 
central government debt came to about 13%, in some months in 2009 and 2010 
reaching almost 20% (figure 10). As a result of this, the roll-over risk to which 
debt management was exposed rose considerably. 
This way of financing was also connected with rising market risk due to the fact 
that interest rates on T-bills rose at the first signs of the outbreak of the crisis and 
culminated in a period when the inflow of capital from abroad dropped off marke-
dly, that is, from the end of 2008 to the end of 2009 (figure 11). After international 
government bonds had been issued in the middle and at the end of 2009 and after 
the liquidity of the banking system had increased, due to measures of monetary 
policy, interest rates on T-bills fell to levels lower than those from the beginning 
of 2008.
Auctions of T-bills were held more frequently than had been common before – in 
some months up to five times. There were particularly frequent auctions of T-bills 
with maturities of 364 days. In November 2008, T-bills with a maturity of 728 
days were issued for the first time, but after that no further issues of T-bills with 
figure 10 
Maturity structure of consolidated central government debt (in %)
Source: Croatian National Bank, Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia.
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95that maturity were issued. From March 2009 on, there were regular auctions of 
364 days T-bills denominated in euro. 
figure 11
Average monthly interest rate on T-bills
Source: Croatian National Bank.
It can be observed that the government, with this type of borrowing, assumed an 
ever greater currency risk, since up to the end of 2008 it issued even more euro 
T-bills. In some months of 2009, the share of euro-denominated T-bills reached 
almost 50%, and their share in total outstanding T-bills remained above 40% even 
at the end of 2010 (figure 12). In the period in which the difficulties in meeting the 
government borrowing needs were most pronounced, from January to October 
2009, the government occasionally resorted to the non-market financing by short-
term loans from domestic banks.
Financing with non-marketable debt instruments increased during the crisis. Apart 
from short-term financing from domestic banks, at the beginning of 2008 the go-
vernment started to be financed with syndicated foreign currency loans – the 
amount of which had increased from the initial 500 million to 1.6 billion euro by 
the end of 2010. As a consequence, the share of non-marketable debt of the central 
government increased from 20% at the beginning of 2008 to 34% in the first half 
of 2009. After that, the share of marketable debt began to recover (figure 13). It is 
evident that in the period of the most severe crisis the government had given up on 
some of the pre-crisis objectives stated in the Annual Report and Public Debt 
Management Guidelines – that is, widening the investor base and the development 
of a domestic market for debt securities by issuing kuna bonds with varying ma-
turities and creating a yield curve (Ministry of Finance, 2006).
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In the period from early 2008 until the end of March 2011, the only long-term debt 
instruments the government issued were three domestic and four international bonds. 
On the foreign bond market, it issued bonds for the first time in June 2009, and on the 
domestic market only in June 2010. Of the four foreign issues, one refers to an issue 
in euro and three to bonds issued on the American market in American dollars. Only 
the last foreign issuance of dollar-denominated bonds of March 2011 was hedged 
against currency risk. One of the three domestic issuances of government bonds re-
fers also to a foreign currency, i.e. a euro-denominated bond. Accordingly, the cur-
rency risk also figures largely in financing through government bonds. 
Based on the moment in which the government decided to make a bond placement on 
the foreign and then on the domestic market, it can be concluded that the government 
postponed the issuance of bonds until the market risk premium associated with Croa-
tian bonds expressed by Credit Default Swaps (CDS) started to stabilize (figure 14). 
This notwithstanding, all seven government bonds have high coupon interest rates 
ranging from 6.25 to 6.75%, there being no noticeable difference between the level of 
interest rates on domestic and foreign issues. Since Croatia issues government bonds 
relatively rarely, and since they are of diverse characteristics, while the Public Debt 
Management Directorate gives potential investors very little information about future 
issuances nor has it instituted a system of primary dealers, it can be argued that the 
interest rates reflect an assessment of the credibility of public finance management as 
well as the liquidity risk associated with the Croatian government debt.3
3 For determinants of government bond spreads, see for example Attinasi, Checherita and Nikel (2009) and 
Favero, Missale and Piga (2000).
figure 12
Short-term central government debt (billion kuna)
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia.
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figure 13 
Consolidated central government debt in terms of its marketability (in %)
Source: Croatian National Bank, Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia.
figure 14
Issuances and repayments of government bonds (in billion euro) and price of CDS 
on a 5 year Croatian government bond (in basis points)
Source: Ministry of Finance, Bloomberg.
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7 conclusion and recommendations
During the global financial and economic crisis, it was once again evident that 
public debt management cannot replace prudent fiscal policy. Many EU countries 
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98 even before the onset of the crisis had considerable deficits and general govern-
ment debts and attempted to alleviate the crisis with fiscal stimulus measures, 
which additionally distorted fiscal imbalances. Nationalization and recapitaliza-
tion of parts of the financial sector and activation of contingent liabilities led to, in 
some countries, an exceptionally large rise in the public debt in many countries. A 
strongly enlarged need for financing in the period of falling demand on the gover-
nment debt market created, even in countries with developed debt management, 
large problems. 
One of the ways of adjusting to changed market conditions was enhanced flexibi-
lity and innovativeness in the policy and techniques for managing public debt, as 
is shown by the examples of Ireland, Hungary and the Netherlands. Croatia was 
not faced with the direct risk of sovereign debt crisis, but it did come upon obvious 
problems in meeting the government borrowing needs. Unlike other European 
countries that attempted to diversify the instruments of short-term financing, 
Croatia resorted to non-market financing to a larger extent. It did not develop 
long-term instruments of financing, nor did it focus on new groups of investors. 
While other countries involved households and other small non-institutional inve-
stors in the financing of the government, management of the public debt in Croatia 
did not develop in this direction. Nor was there any improvement in the practices 
of debt issuance and trading. As before, bonds were sold only through syndicated 
issues and no system of primary dealers to maintain liquidity on the secondary 
market for government debt was introduced. A large part of the sovereign debt is 
denominated in a foreign currency. 
From all this, it can be concluded that public debt management in Croatia is cou-
pled with considerable risks – interest, currency and liquidity risks. In addition, 
because of the nature of the relevant institutions, it is not independent of fiscal 
policy and the availability of information about public debt management is excep-
tionally poor. The system for managing public debt has not improved at all since 
2004 when the World Bank and the IMF drew up and published a report about the 
state of public debt management (WB, IMF 2005).
Although in spite of these weaknesses, government financing was not endangered 
during the crisis, it can be assumed that with greater flexibility in public debt ma-
nagement, government financing requirements would be met with higher certainty 
and at lower costs. The existing method of managing public debt in Croatia ensu-
res only one part of its basic objective – that is, meeting government borrowing 
needs. However, it does not guarantee the achievement of minimal costs with an 
acceptable risk level and cannot provide any appropriate contribution to fiscal 
policy in the sense of reducing interest expenditure. Public debt management 
should be given greater attention and be developed in line with good practice in 
EU countries.
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